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Abstract
This project aims to examine a particular property of worry that some therapists
claim interferes with the treatment of clients who worry. Research has shown that
worry is predominately composed of concepts or thoughts rather than images
(Borkovec & Hu, 1990). In particular this project aims to investigate whether the

verbal linguistic nature of worry contributes to the sense that participants have
that it is uncontrollable. Attempting to control an image results in a paradoxical
effect of an increase in the frequency of the image (Wegner, Schneider, Carter &
White, 1987). Does the same paradoxical effect occur when thoughts and not
images are suppressed? This project seeks to determine whether there is a
differential effect when personally relevant valenced thought and personally
relevant valenced images are suppressed. To investigate whether a difference
exists, 80 participants reported the number of intrusions of a self nominated
positively or negatively valenced personally relevant mentation during an 10
minute interval. A 2 (valence: negative, positive) x 2(mentation: image, thought)
by 2 (thought instruction; suppress, free expression) Analysis of Covariance
(ANCOVA) examined the difference in the immediate and subsequent effects that
occur when individuals are instructed to suppress valenced personally relevant
thoughts, as c_ompared to when individuals are instructed to suppress valenced
personally relevant images. Results showed that there were no significant
differences between the overall manipulation of thoughts and images during the
testing interval. However, there was a significant interaction of thought instruction
and type of mentation which resulted in a significantly lower number of intrusions
(p=.004) for suppression of thoughts. A post hoc test on the interaction between

6
valence and thought instruction (p=. 051 ), for negatively valenced mentations
revealed a significant decrease in the number of negative cognitions in the post
suppression period (p = .027). All of this implies, firstly, that the conceptual nature
of worry is unlikely to contribute to an appraisal of uncontrollability, and secondly,
that suppression of negatively valenced mentation may be an effective way of
reducing aversive intrusive activity.
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Does the Conceptual Nature of Worry Contribute to its
Uncontrollability? Unravelling the Complex Interactions of Some of
the Properties of Worry.
Very often therapists coach clients in techniques that are intended to help to
control aversive mental activity. These techniques include simple coping
techniques such as distraction or suppression (eg., thought stopping as in Dollard
& Miller, 1950; Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966; Mathews & Milroy, 1994). However not
all techniques achieve the desired results. For example, one aversive mental
activity at which increased research is directed is worry, because techniques used
to control worry have not always been effective, or even counter productive
(Butler, 1994; Andrews, Crino, Hunt, Lampe & Page, 1994). Some have argued
that this is due to one of the characteristics of worry, its conceptual nature ( eg.
Roemer & Borkovec, 1993; Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993). Is the conceptual
nature of worry also responsible for the perceived uncontrollability of worry?
The Conceptual Nature of Worry
Borkovec and colleagues concluded that worry is composed principally of thought
because of a number of experiments that originated from a initial study of insomnia
(Gross & Borkovec, 1982). In the original experiment, they saw that cognitive
intrusion just prior to sleep resulted in retardation of sleep onset. Three groups of
good sleepers were brought into a lab and given instructions to fall asleep as
quickly as possible. One group was told nothing further, the second group was
told that as some stage they would be woken to give a speech. The third group
was told that as some stage they would be woken to give a speech on "how to
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reduce inflation without inducing depression". Gross and Borkovec ( 1982) found
that participants in the third condition of cognitive intrusion manipulation took
twice as long as the other two groups to fall asleep. This finding led to later
experiments that attempted to look specifically at attempts to control the intrusive
cognitive activity, which Borkovec and colleagues saw as worry.
In a large community sample, Borkovec & Lyonfields (1993) found that 51 %
rated worry as composed of thought, 3% rated worry as composed of images, and
46% rated worry as composed of a combination of thought and images.
Furthermore, they found that when 300 college students were given aforced

choice format, 70% reported that worry was composed of thought, and 30%
reported that worry was composed of images. This finding that worry is composed
predominantly of thoughts confirmed the earlier findings ofBorkovec and Inz
(1990).
Borkovec and Inz (1990) compared the self report of matched non-anxious
controls and clients with Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) during relaxation,
directed worry and subsequent relaxation. Worry is defined as the cardinal feature
of GAD (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Borkovec and Inz (1990)
found that "relaxing" controls reported a vast amount of imagery and little
thinking, whereas GAD clients reported equal amounts of each. When asked to
engage in personally relevant worry, both groups (the "relaxing" controls and the
clients with GAD) showed a shift to heightened frequency of thought and lowered
frequency of imagery. When both groups returned to the relaxation condition, both
reported a return to previous levels.
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Other Properties of Worry
Borkovec and colleagues argue that because worry is composed of thought
rather than images it has additional properties. Specifically these properties have
consequences for the treatment of worry or the treatment of anxiety disorders
where worry is a major feature. I intend to discuss firstly the consequence of
worry being composed of thought, and how the very nature of worry, its
conceptual or thoughtlike structure, may interfere with treatment (Roemer &
Borkovec, 1993; Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993). The second important property
that will be discussed is the uncontrollability of worry. I will then discuss the
implications of attempts to control worry by addressing some of the relevant
empirical findings of the suppression paradigm. It will be suggested that because
worry is composed predominantly of thoughts rather than images, attempts to
treat worry actually function to maintain worry. Attempts to control worry by
suppressing worrisome thoughts may act to contribute to its uncontrollability.
If Worry is Composed of Thought, What Does This Mean for the Treatment of
Worry
The discovery that worry is mainly composed of thought is important when
considering treatment. Treating clients who worry or who have GAD has been
shown to be difficult (eg., Andrews et al., 1994; Roemer & Borkovec, 1993).
One method of treatment that has been used is emotional processing (Foa &
Kozak, 1986). The aim of emotional processing is to access the affective

associative systems, thereby exposing the source of the fear that underlies the
memory. This allows corrective information to change how the fearful stimuli
should be viewed, which will eventually bring about habituation and a
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corresponding reduction in symptomatology (Foa & Kozak,1986). Exposure
treatment is said to be effective only when the client emotionally processes the
fearful stimuli (Foa & Kozak, 1986). Such processing is evidenced by a large
initial physiological activation in response to the fearful material (Foa & Kozak,
1986). When a client avoids a fear cue either behaviourally or cognitively, the
associative network of threatening material surrounding the cue is not accessed
and therefore cannot be modified with corrective information (F oa & Kozak,
1986).
Roemer and Borkovec (1993) speculate that because worry is composed of
thought, there are a number of consequences for treatment. Firstly, that for
effective treatment of clients with an anxiety disorder (who concomitantly are
experiencing worry), using emotional processing effectively is not possible because
the conceptual (verbal linguistic) nature of worry prevents access to the affective
associative network (Borkovec, Shadick & Hopkins, 1991; Roemer & Borkovec,
1993). As a consequence, two things result: first, physiological activation does not
occur as a response to the threatening stimuli, and second, corrective information
does not get through to the affective network.
The second important point is that although this process may be unconscious,
the secondary gain of an absence of physiological activation may result in clients
consciously using the conceptual nature of worry to avoid the aversive
physiological symptoms that are the response to a fearful stimulus. That is, clients
will engage in worry not simply to problem solve, but in order to avoid or gain
relief from the aversive symptoms of anxiety (eg., Roemer & Borkovec, 1993).
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Worry has certainly been found to suppress cardiovascular response to fearful
stimuli. For example, Borkovec and Hu (1990) compared the cardiovascular
response of three groups to a phobic stimulus. Prior to exposure, the groups were
required to engage in neutral thinking, worrisome thinking or relaxation. They
found that engaging in worrisome thinking before visualisation of a phobic image
eliminated cardiovascular response to that image (Borkovec & Hu, 1990).
Conversely, Wells (1994) argues that the reason that corrective information
does not get through is not because of the conceptual nature of worry but because
there is a capacity overload, and the resulting bottleneck does not allow for the
encoding of the corrective information.
Treating Worry
It is important therefore in the treatment of anxiety disorders to treat worry
first (Roemer & Borkovec,1993) because worry's conceptual nature may prevent
access to the affective associative network. However, informal questioning of non
pathological worriers carried out in pilot studies for research into the processes
that people use to control worry suggest that the most common strategies these
people use to control worry are distraction, problem solving and deciding not to
worry (Butler, 1994). Are these strategies problematic when trying to treat worry?
Distraction techniques are sometimes presented to clients in order to relieve
clients of negative symptomatology (eg., Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979).
These techniques include diversion techniques such as instructing clients to
concentrate on detail items in consultation rooms, and have been found to reduce
negative thought frequency and reduced affect (Fennel & Teasdale, 1984; Fennel,

------------------------------------------
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Teasdale, Jones & Damle, 1987). They have not yet been shown to be effective
with worry (Butler, 1994).
Other therapists argue that worry is actually exacerbated problem solving and
that worriers have cognitive pre-dispositions that interfere with effective problem
solving (Davey, 1994; Flett & Blankstein, 1994). Davey (1994) believes that
worriers have a preponderance of negative cognitions, a tendency to interpret
ambiguous events as threatening, and they have poor problem solving confidence.
Accordingly, targeting these factors is an important approach in treatment,
especially working on problem solving confidence (Davey, 1994).
The third factor that the pilot study nominated was "deciding not to
worry"(Butler, 1994). Is this strategy associated with the perception that worry is
uncontrollable?
The Uncontrollability of Worry
The difficulty of controlling the process of worry is a property of worry that
has been shown to be problematic with treatment in both normal and clinical
populations (Borkovec et al, 1990; APA, 1994). There are a number of theoretical
positions on this. Some argue that worriers cannot decide not to worry, because it
will result in a paradoxical result such as the content of worry returning to mind,
leading to a perception that worry is uncontrollable (Roemer & Borkovec, 1993).
Others maintain that worry is initiated automatically, but that its processing is a
consciously controlled process (eg., Wells, 1994). Wells ( 1994) suggests that
worry is a consciously controlled process. He believes that although it may be
initiated automatically and involuntarily, it is a conscious controlled processing
activity requiring large amounts of processing capacity. He suggests that one
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reason for its uncontrollability is because of appraisals surrounding the involuntary
initiation of worry.
Alternatively, Roemer & Borkovec (1993) suggest that it is like telling people
not to think of a white bear. When people are told not to think about a white bear,
paradoxically they cannot do so (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987).
They report that during a period of attempted suppression of the image, the image
of a white bear intrudes (Wegner et al, 1987). This increase in frequency of the
image (relative to levels found when participants do not first suppress the thought)
has been observed in a number of studies. The literature has reflected both an
immediate increase in the frequency of the nominated mentation or a subsequent
increase in the frequency of the nominated mentation after suppression has ceased.
Perhaps during worry, in an attempt to suppress the frightening image or
frightening thought, a process similar to the process of suppressing a white bear
occurs; it becomes impossible, and multiple intrusions occur (Roemer &
Borkovec, 1993). This argument has been supported by some studies. For
example, Tallis, Davey and Capuzzo (1994) found that 75% of subjects in their
study reported a paradoxical effect when they attempted to suppress worry. An
important distinction, however, is that there is a difference in both the nature and
the valence of a "white bear" and "worry" (Roemer & Borkovec, 1993 ). A white
bear is a neutrally valenced image, and worry is a negatively valenced series of
thoughts (Roemer & Borkovec, 1993).
The Role of Cognitions in Anxiety
It has been established that cognitive processes are implicated in anxiety
disorders. Behavioural avoidance has been implicated in the maintenance of
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phobias. For example, McNally and Steketee (1985) proposed that avoidance
behaviour leads to fear maintenance. Cognitive avoidance such as suppression of
specified mentations has empirically been shown to maintain and perhaps
exacerbate anxiety disorders (eg., Zeitlen, Netten & Hodder, 1995). GAD is not
the only disorder in which intrusive cognitions cause distress (Brown, Dowdall,
Cote & Barlow, 1994). Disturbing, aversive, unwanted, intrusive mentations are
also a common symptom of other psychological disorders such as Post-traumatic

stress disorder (PTSD) and Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD; APA, 1994).
Very often, clients with these disorders try to suppress the negatively valenced
conceptual activity and/or the negatively valenced image without notable success.
Many researchers have pointed out the utility of laboratory models of the aetiology
of obsessions or worry or flashbacks (eg., Wegner, 1989; Trinder & Salkovskis,
1994; Zeitlin et al., 1995). The suppression paradigm has been suggested as one
avenue for developing a laboratory model of certain anxiety disorders (eg.,
Wegner, 1989; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994).
Since the first experiment by Wegner et al. (1987) empirical research with the
suppression paradigm has revealed information that may be helpful in developing
models of psychopathology. This additional information may help us to understand
more about the uncontrollability of worry. For example, if we establish there is a
difference between the suppression of a thought as compared to suppression of an
image, then it would also be useful to establish whether there is also a difference in
the suppression ofvalenced mentation.
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Review of the Suppression Paradigm
Wegner et al. (1987) found that suppression of the images of white bears led to
a rebound effect. While participants are suppressing a particular thought, they
report fewer occurrences of that thought than participants who are not
suppressing. However when they stop suppressing, they report more occurrences
of the thought than people who did not suppress. This finding was replicated by
Clark, Ball and Pape ( 1991 ), who used the stimulus of green rabbits with three
groups who were required to verbalise their stream of consciousness for 2 twominute periods. In the first period, one group was ask~d to think about anything
except green rabbits, the second group was asked to think about anything
including green rabbits, and the third group was asked to think about anything at
all. In the second period, all groups were asked to think about anything at all.
Consistent with the rebound effect, the first group reported significantly fewer
images of green rabbits than the other two groups in the first period, and they
reported significantly more images of the green rabbits in the second period.
In contrast to this finding by Wegner et al. ( 1987) and Clark et al ( 1991) of a
rebound effect, others ( eg., Lavy and van den Hout, 1990 and Merckelbach, Muris,
van den Hout and de Jong , 1991) found an immediate enhancement effect during
the suppression period. An enhancement effect differs from a rebound effect by
virtue of when the paradoxical effect occurs. With a rebound effect there is a
paradoxical effect evident in the post suppression period, whereas with an
enhancement effect there is a paradoxical effect immediately apparent in the
suppression period itself

17
There continues to be no clear consistency as to when a rebound effect or
enhancement effect occurs (Muris, Merckelbach, van den Hout & de Jong, 1992).
Some researchers (eg., Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994) have argued that suppression
is most likely a continuous process. They suggest it is unlikely that people are able
to suppress a particular mentation for a period only to have it return in greater
numbers. As such, the enhancement effect may be an explanation that may be
applicable to models of psychological disorders such as OCD in which intrusive
thoughts are prominent (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994).
Experiencing unwanted intrusive thoughts has been found to be experienced by
80% of the nonclinical population (Rachman and de Silva, 1978). The similarity
between normal intrusive thoughts and clinical intrusive thoughts led Rachman
(1978) to speculate that normal intrusive thoughts may play a role in the aetiology
of OCD. This was later extended by Salkovskis (1985, 1989) in a cognitive
behavioural hypothesis of OCD. It was argued that the initial appraisal of an
intrusive thought led to beliefs of personal responsibility based on the content of
the intrusion, and subsequently to compensatory behaviours. Appraisal is central
to his hypothesis (Salkovskis, 1989). Trinder and Salkovskis (1994) also noted the
role that appraisal of initial intrusions may have in the development of disorders
such as OCD and PTSD
Wegner (1988, 1989) argues that the rebound effect represents a laboratory
model of the aetiology of real life obsessions. This is in line, he argues, with the
clinical studies that show abnormal obsessions are accompanied by an urge to
resist or suppress the intrusive thoughts (eg., Rachman & de Silva, 1978).
However, the parallel between the rebound/enhancement effect and abnormal
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obsessions is not as clear cut. Until clear predeterminates exist it is hard to extend
the findings in the suppression paradigm to other models of psychological
disorders. Zeitlin et al (1995) observe that determining whether there is a rebound
effect or an enhancement effect may depend on the clinical disorder. For example,
clinical reports of OCD and PTSD patients suggest that attempts to suppress
intrusive mentations result in an immediate increase in their occurrence (Zeitlin et
al, 1995).
The Role of the Valence of the Mentation Affecting a Rebound and/or an
Enhancement Effect
Some studies have indicated the valence and the personal relevance of the
mentation are implicated in the paradoxical result of attempts at suppression of
intrusive thoughts. For example, Muris et al.(1992) found the valence of the
mentation may influence whether there is a rebound effect. They found a clear
difference in an experiment in which one group was required to suppress valenced
material and another group was required to suppress neutral material. They found
that the immediate enhancement effect seems to be limited to situations in which
suppression is directed at neutral material. This finding is in accordance with the
findings of Lavy and van den Hout (1990) who found an immediate enhancement
effect when participants were instructed to suppress neutral thoughts (sic) about a
vehicle.
These findings were in line with others. Wegner and Gold (1992) looked at the
application of suppression to participant's own thoughts of a previous romantic
partner. Participants were divided into two groups: those who were to suppress
thoughts of a still desired previous romantic partner (a "hot flame") and those who
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were to suppress thoughts of a no longer desired previous romantic partner (a
"cold flame"). The data suggested that the rebound effect may not occur when the
mentation is valenced. Their findings were in contrast with the retrospective study
ofMuris and Merckelbach (1991, as cited by Muris et al, 1992) who found data to
suggest that suppression of emotional material would produce strong rebound
effects.
Certainly, Wenzlaff, Wegner and Roper's (1988) series of experiments found
that depressed individuals' efforts to suppress negatively valenced thoughts were
undermined by the selection of emotionally valenced distracters. The data from
these experiments suggested that depressed participants suffered from a particular
deficit in the suppression of negatively valenced material, but were able to
suppress positively valenced material. To assess this, Wenzlaff and others
(Experiment 1) examined the valence of the thoughts preceding and following the
specific intrusion. They found that the results supported the hypothesis that
depressed individuals employ distracters that are emotionally related to the
negative thoughts they are trying to suppress and, therefore serve to prompt
awareness of the unwanted material.
However even when supplied with positive distractors, and even while
recognising that positive distractors are more efficient, depressed individuals chose
negative distractors because they are more accessible (Wenzlaff et al, 1988,
Experiment 3).
Wenzlaff, Wegner and Klein ( 1991) found in a series of experiments that
suppression creates a bond between the suppressed mentation and the associated
valence of the context. In the first experiment they induced positive and negative
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mood states with the associated suppression of a neutral mentation. In the
subsequent free expression period, they found that if the induced mood state
matched the previous suppression induced mood state, participants reported more
intrusions of the negative stimulus. This was in comparison with participants
whose mood induced states in the expression period were not matched with the
mood induced state in the initial suppression period. Again this process is similar
to that proposed by Wells and Papageorgiou (1994) in their conceptualisation of
the process of worry.
Wells and Papageorgiou ( 1994) believe that worry both tags and blocks
emotional integration. The tagging increases the subsequent number of mood
related intrusions. The blocking occurs because the conceptual nature of worry
prevents further processing of images, and thus prevents integration of the
emotional material. This is further maintained because the conceptual nature of
worry consequently blocks the aversive physiological activation, and thus acts to
maintain anxiety because it is also blocking emotional integration. This will
therefore lead to a maintenance of intrusions as a symptom of incomplete
emotional processing (Rachman, 1980).
Distinguishing Between Thought and Images in the Suppression Paradigm
The suppression paradigm does not distinguish between thought and images.
Wegner and Gold (1992) did not distinguish between thoughts about the previous
romantic partner and images of the previous romantic partner. They suggested that
the rebound effect may not occur with emotional thoughts because the participants
may, somehow, defend themselves from them. However, intrusive thoughts can be
both pleasant and unpleasant (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987), and mentations about
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previous romantic partners could intuitively be either or both. Mentations about
previous partners may also be images or conceptual or both.
In their investigation of the effects of suppression of personal intrusive
thoughts, Kelly and Kahn ( 1994) apparently did not distinguish between thoughts
and images. In fact they defined the mentation to be suppressed to include both the
thought, and the image that comes to mind when the thought is initiated.
Participants were asked to draw the resulting image, and then to label the image
with one or two words. During the suppression period, participants were asked to
suppress the image and/or the words used to describe the image with no
distinction of which participants suppressed which type of mentation.
The Influence of the Personal Relevance of the Mentation in Determining Whether
There is a Rebound and/or Enhancement Effect
Kelly and Kahn ( 1994, Experiment 1) found that valence played no part in the
presence of a rebound effect. However in Experiment 2, they compared the
suppression of a white bear with the participant's personally relevant intrusive
thought/image. In this experiment, participants in the personally relevant intrusive

thought/image condition were required to write down their most frequently
occurring intrusive thought. Secondly, all participants were required to visualise a
picture of the mentation that they were required to manipulate. They found that
suppressing images of a white bear was significantly more difficult than
suppressing images/thoughts of a personally relevant image/thought.
They argued that the personal relevance of the mentation may play a key role in
the ability of the participant to defend themselves from the intrusive mentation
(Kelly & Kahn, 1994, Experiment 1 & 2). They suggest that this is because the
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participant has had time to establish a network of distractor thoughts that will
enable further intrusions to be defended. As such, participants given a new
mentation to suppress will use the immediate environment, which in laboratory
settings may be very sparse, whereas those who have already developed distractor
thoughts will have a wider field to draw from. Kelly and Kahn (1994) suggest that
experience with a mentation will reduce or reverse the rebound. They also suggest
that a lack of continuity between expression and initial suppression contexts may
account for the presence of the rebound effect. Specifically, they suggest that
because participants are asked to express previously suppressed thoughts in a new
setting, they are unable to access the network of distractors that might be available
in the prior setting.
Methodological Issues with the Suppression Paradigm
As already mentioned, there are a number of crucial methodological points
about using the findings of the suppression paradigm in order to develop a model
of psychological disorders. Firstly, in all of the suppression experiments there is no
distinction between the type of mentation (ie., images or thoughts) when
instructing the participants. It may be that some participants are suppressing
images and some are suppressing thoughts. It has not yet been established that the
mechanism of suppression is the same with the different types of mentation
(Roemer & Borkovec, 1993). It has been suggested that distinguishing between
thought and images is important, as the nature of these different types of
mentations may influence the efficacy of treatments such as the use of emotional
processing (Foa & Kozak, 1986).
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A further crucial methodological point is the relevance of the mentations that
participants may be asked to suppress. For example, Salkovskis and Campbell
(1994) found an enhancement effect for those participants who were asked to
suppress personally relevant negatively valenced mentations. In contrast Kelly &
Kahn (1994) suggested that experience with the mentation to be suppressed
enabled the establishment of a distractor network, and hence a reduction or
reversal of the rebound. Some researchers (eg., Muris et al., 1992) have argued
that it is important to establish a predictable model in the laboratory before
attempting to apply findings in the paradigm to models of clinical disorders.
However, other findings (eg., Kelly & Kahn, 1994; Wenzlaff, Wegner and Roper,
1988) indicate that the personal relevance of the mentation as well as the context
in which the stimulus is suppressed may be significant in the paradoxical effect of
suppression. Therefore trying to confine the research to the laboratory may not be
the most fruitful way to proceed.
Developing a Methodology
There are also differences in the manner in which the number of intrusive
mentations are measured in many of these experiments. Some have argued (eg.,
Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994) that the difference in the effect may be due to the
manner in which the number of intrusive mentations are measured. For example,
studies by Wegner et al. (1987), Wegner, Schneider, Knutson and McMahon
( 1991) and Clark et al. ( 1991) where researchers found evidence of a rebound
effect required participants to verbalise their stream of consciousness, and to ring a
bell when they experienced the intrusive thought. Conversely, Merckelbach et al.
(1991) and Muris et al. (1992), who did not find evidence of a rebound effect,
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used a different methodology. They asked participants to think silently and to
press the button of an event marker when the intrusive thought occurred.
However, Muris, Merckelbach and de Jong (1993) found that similar results are
obtained using different methods (ie., streaming or recording) of measuring
mentation intrusions. In their experiment, they found no evidence of a rebound
effect with both groups.
Borkovec and Roemer (1993) noted that it would be hard to
develop the methodology that enables us to look at the difference in defining a
thought and defining an image, particularly in an experimental setting. Thought or
conceptual activity is defined as a verbal linguistic activity (Borkovec &
Lyonfields, 1993; Borkovec & Inz, 1990). Methodologies which would require
verbalising the stream of consciousness would suit the experimental manipulations
of thought but would not suit experimental manipulations of imagery.
Accordingly, using a clicker or tick mechanism would most likely be conducive to
both types of mentations. It would seem probable that participants who are asked
to distinguish between thought and imagery in an experimental manipulation
would find it difficult to suppress one type of mentation to concentrate on the
other. Such instructions would most likely only confound the object of the
experiment.
Defining thought in this experimental manipulation was based on early
experiments on insomnia by Borkovec and colleagues. In these early experiments,
Gross and Borkovec (1982) instructed participants in a sleep setting that they
were going to be awakened at some point to give a speech on "how to reduce
inflation without reducing depression". As a result of this cognitive manipulation,
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participants in this sleep group engaged in worry or predominantly verbal linguistic
activity, and took twice as long to get to sleep. Accordingly, it was decided for
this study to instruct participants in any thought suppression group that they
would be required to present a speech at some future time. Participants who
would be required to suppress an image would be induced to choose a particular
scene.
Zeitlin et. al. (1995) noted that the suppression paradigm may hold the key to
understanding different patterns in different clinical disorders and hence enable us
to build models of psychopathology. Specifically the empirical findings within this
paradigm may enable us to understand what happens when clients attempt,
consciously or not, to control their own symptomatology. Initially it is helpful to
look at what happens in a nonclinical population, before selecting different clinical
disorders to examine. It is recognised that there are always individuals who have
undiagnosed levels of clinical depression, clinical anxiety and/or OCD.
Accordingly measures of clinical depression, anxiety and OCD should be taken in
order to account for confounding differences in the experimental conditions solely
due to the presence of these disorders.
Order of Presentation
A further important methodological issue is the issue of the order of
presentation. Some studies (eg., Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec & Inz, 1990)
have implicated the order of presentation or preparedness in the development of
psychopathological symptomatology. This would be in accordance with Gray's
( 1982) theory of anxiety, which holds that the behavioural inhibition system is
activated when there is a mismatch between incoming information and expected
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information when the expected information is aversive. This has methodological
consequences in two ways. Firstly, it is a strong rationale for presenting the clinical
instruments last, so the aversive reaction to their content noted in the pilot study
does not affect the participants in the differently valenced groups. Secondly, if
Gray's theory is correct, then it may influence any within group manipulation of
positive and negative valence. Accordingly, the manipulation ofvalencing the
mentation should be between the nominated groups.
Present Study
In this context the present experiment is designed to examine the role of the
three independent variables, Mentation, Valence and Thought Instruction over an
interval. Mentation refers to the two types of cognitive activity: verbal, linguistic
activity or thought, and images. Valence refers to two poles of valence, positive
and negative. Thought instruction refers to suppression and non suppression. An
outline of the implications of manipulating these variables will be presented before
outlining the hypotheses.
The nature of the mentation. If there is a difference in the manipulation of
thoughts and images over the interval, then this tells us that the ability to suppress,
then not suppress is different for thoughts and images.
Valence. If there was a significant difference in the number ofvalenced
mentations between the groups due to the valence of the mentation, this would tell
us that whether the mentation was valenced either positively or negatively
significantly affects the number of reported intrusions over the interval.
Thought instruction. If there was a significant difference between the groups
because of the thought instruction (suppression or non suppression) then this
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manipulation would replicate the findings of the suppression paradigm and may
enable us to understand the predeterminates of the existence of a rebound effect
(eg.,Wegner et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1991), or a enhancement effect (eg., Lavy &
van den Hout, 1990; Merckelbach et al, 1991).
Valence and mentation. If there was an interaction effect between Valence and
type of Mentation, this would mean that there is a difference in the number of self
reported intrusions at different levels of the two independent variables, Valence
and Mentation. That is to say that there is a different number of intrusions because
of the nature of the mentation (thought or image) and the valence of the mentation
(positive or negative). If as Borkovec and colleagues suggest, worry is composed
predominantly of thoughts which are negatively valenced and there is a significant
difference between the number of intrusions of negatively valenced thoughts
compared to positively valenced images, then it might be argued that the
conceptual nature of worry contributes to the uncontrollability of worry.
Mentation and thought instruction. If there was an interaction effect for
Mentation and Thought Instruction, there would be a different number of self
reported intrusions for each type of mentation (thought, image) during suppression
and non suppression.
Valence and thought instruction. If there was an interaction effect for valence
i

,;
and thought instruction, this could be due to a significantly different number of
intrusions dependent on the valence of the mentation during suppression and non
suppression. For example, either negatively valenced mentations could result in
significantly more intrusions during suppression or positively valenced mentations
could do so during the suppression period. Alternatively, negatively valenced

28
intrusions could result in significantly more intrusions than would positively
valenced mentations result during the non suppression period. The influence of
valence on intrusion during a period of an interval of suppression followed by non
suppression may be helpful in understanding the processes involved in disorders
which are negatively valenced and in which some form of suppression may be
implicated.
Mentation by valence by thought instruction. If there was a interaction effect
for Mentation by Valence by Thought Instruction, it would mean that there was a
difference in the number of self-reported intrusions for a particular combination of
the three independent variables. The interpretation of such an effect would depend
upon a more detailed analysis of the exact results.
Aims and Hypotheses
The intention of the project is to examine whether there is a difference in the
suppression and subsequent non suppression of the two types of cognitive activity.
In addition the project will examine whether the positive or negative valence of the
cognitive activity has a differential effect during the interval of suppression,
followed by non suppression. It is hypothesised that there will be a difference in
the differential effects of the suppression of the two types ofvalenced mentation.
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Method
Participants
Initial participants were 100 male and female undergraduates recruited from
Churchlands and Joondalup campuses at Edith Cowan University, Western
Australia. Participants, whose ages ranged from 18 to 60, were given no credit or
financial benefits for their participation.
Coursework assessments occurred for these students in the period following
week 8 onwards and anecdotal reports indicated that high levels of anxiety and/or
depression were common around assessment time. Anecdotal reports also reported
that first year students were highly anxious at the commencement of semester one.
Accordingly testing took place in weeks 2-5 of semester two because it was
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anticipated that this was the time ofleast anxiety and least depression for the
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participants.

j
Design

A 2 (Valence: positive, negative) by 2 (Mentation: thought, image) by 2

(Thought Instruction: suppression, expression) design was used. Participants were
randomly allocated to one of four groups; negative image, negative thought,

positive image or positive thought, with Thought Instruction as a withinparticipant variable.
There were three parts to the experiment: the initial part, the experimental part
and the manipulation checks.

l;
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Procedure
On arrival, all participants were asked to wait for five minutes in another room
before they were taken into the experimental room. This was to give participants
the opportunity to calm themselves, if necessary, before the experiment was
conducted. If participants seemed too rushed or anxious to wait, another
appointment was offered. At the commencement of the experiment, participants
were taken to a sound proof room, where they were invited to sit in a large
comfortable chair. The room was approximately 2 square metres, and contained a
comfortable chair, a desk and a spare chair. There was a two way mirror through
which participants could be viewed. All participants were initially told that they
were involved in a study of the way people think, and they were then given the
chance to ask questions. Each participant was told that they could stop the
experiment at any time, and that they could leave at any time.
After each participant was given a few minutes to settle down, they were read
the standardised instructions relevant to the group to which they were allocated.
Students were randomly allocated to one of four groups (See Table 1).
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Table 1.
Experimental Design
Allocated Group

1 . Negative Image
2. Negative thought

3. Positive image
4. Positive thought

Period
Thought Instruction
Suppression
Non suppression
Suppression
Non suppression
Suppression
Non suppression
Suppression
Non suppression

Specifically participants in the image groups were asked to picture something
that they found to be either positively or negatively valenced, respectively.
Participants in the thought groups were asked to choose a topic for a speech on
either a negative or positive topic. Participants in the thought groups were given
lists of general topics that might be stimulus for topics that were personally
relevant to them (Kelly & Kahn, 1994; see Table 2). All participants took as much
time as they needed to choose the respective image or speech topic, and all
participants were told that they did not have to disclose the content of their
mentation.
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Table 2.
Optional Speech Topics Made Available To All Participants.
Positively valenced topics:
How my pet brings me joy.
My TEE results and how they have shaped my future.
The birth of a child.
The love of my life and why I call him/her that.
When I win Lotto ...
Negatively valenced topics:
My TEE results and how they have changed my future.
Losing the love of my life.
The abuse of children: should it be punished or forgotten.
The death of a pet.
The death of a parent and the influence on my life.
Based on content of intrusive thoughts of 104 participants in Experiment 1,
Kelly & Kahn, 1994.

When they had chosen the content of their mentation, they were told to "please
indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how negative/positive (as appropriate) you would
rate the topic." If participants rated the personally relevant mentation as less than
7/10, then participants were asked how they could change the mentation to make
it more positively valenced or negatively (as appropriate). The session continued if
the participant rated the valence of the personally relevant mentation as greater
than or equal to 7.
The Experimental Period
The suppression period. In this section of the experiment, participants were
read the standardised instructions relevant to their assigned group (See Appendix
A). Participants in the image groups were asked to 'not think about the agreed
image for a period of 5 minutes.' If participants found that the image did come to
mind, they were told to suppress the image, and to indicate that the image has
returned by marking the worksheet which was placed in front of them (See
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Appendix B). In order to prepare for that possibility, participants were asked to
have the pencil in their hand near the worksheet. When it was clear that the
participant understood the instructions, the experimenter left the room, and
returned after 5 minutes was completed.
Participants in the thought groups were read the standardised instructions
relative to their group. They were told that they would be invited to 'give a speech
on the agreed topic in approximately 10 minutes time'. They were told that the
speech would be videotaped, but there would be no audience, and no one viewing
the tape. Until then participants were told to suppress all thoughts of the speech,
that they could think about anything during this time, but they should not think
about the speech they were going to give. Participants were instructed however,
that if they found their thoughts slipping towards the speech, they should suppress
the thought, and mark the worksheet in front of them. In order to prepare for that,
they were instructed to have the pencil in their hand near the paper. When it was
clear that the participant understood the instructions, the experimenter left the
room, and returned after 5 minutes was completed.
The Non Suppression Period. When the experimenter re-entered the room, all
participants were told 'that they should feel free to think about anything'. If they
should think about the agreed mentation ( as appropriate) they should not suppress
the mentation, "but continue to feel free to think about anything." If the agreed
mentation did come to mind, then they were instructed to mark the worksheet in
front of them. When participants indicated that they understood the instructions,
the experimenter left the room for a period of 5 minutes.
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Overview of Manipulation Checks and Debriefing
Participants were taken to a different room and they were asked to rate their
compliance to instructions by indicating on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is most
compliant, and 1 is least compliant.
A detailed consent form was also given to participants to complete (See
Appendix C). Although consent was obtained from all the participants at the
commencement of the experiment, a detailed written consent form was given at
this stage. In the consent form they were again told the role of the experiment, and
they were also told that if they had experienced suicidal ideation, they would be
contacted. They were then left to complete the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI :
Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979), the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI : Beck,
Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988), and the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive

Inventory (MOCI: Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; Rachman & Hodgson,
1980).These inventories are reproduced in Appendix D.
All participants were monitored through a one way mirror during this phase to
ensure that participants did not become suffer any ill effects. Participants were also
given the opportunity in the final debriefing to explore any emotional after effects
with the experimenter. In particular, participants were informed that they would be
contacted by the experimenter if they indicated the presence of suicidal ideation.
After completing the instruments a full debriefing was then conducted with each
participant, and the purpose of the experiment was explained.
Manipulation Checks
Valence. Participants rated how positive or negative their personally relevant
mentation was at the commencement of the experiment. Participants did this by

I
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rating the valence out of I 0, where IO is the maximum valence and 1 is the
minimum valence.
Compliance to instructions. Participants were asked at the completion of the
experiment to indicate whether they had complied with the instructions that were
given to them. Participants did this by rating compliance out of 10, where 10 is the
maximum compliance and I is the minimum compliance.
Instruments
Anxiety. Participants completed the BAI after the experimental phase of the
study. The BAI was designed to measure those symptoms of anxiety that are
minimally shared with those of depression, particularly those symptoms measured
by the BD I. It consists of 21 items that measure the severity of self-reported
anxiety. The total score is the sum of the ratings given by the examinee for the 21
symptoms. Each symptom is rated on a 4 point scale ranging from O to 3. The
maximum score is 63 points. The BAI score ranges are given as an aid in
interpreting the intensity of self-reported anxiety. Total scores of 0-7 points are
given the rating of minimal anxiety; scores of 8-15 indicate mild anxiety; scores of
16-25 indicate moderate anxiety; and scores of 26-63 indicate severe anxiety.
However Beck & Steer (1987, 1990) recommend some caution in using these
ranges. The BAI was developed on psychiatric outpatients, but has been found to
be effective with nonclinical samples (Dent & Salkovskis, 1986). In their study of
nonclinical samples, Dent & Salkovskis (1986) found the mean BAI scores to be
half those of clinical samples diagnosed with anxiety disorders (Fydrich, Dowdall
& Chambless, 1990; Beck & Steer, 1990, 1987). For example, they found in a

sample of 65 university students, that the mean BAI score was 11.08 (SD =9.10).
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Similarly in a sample of 142 medical students, the mean BAI score was 8.89 (SD=
7.30) and in a sample of 36 non students the mean BAI was 7.78 (SD= 5.65).
Depression. Participants completed the BDI at the completion of the
experiment. The BDI has been widely used for the assessment of symptoms
associated with depression for both clinical and nonclinical populations (eg., Steer,
Beck & Garrison, 1985). The purpose of using this instrument is to identify
participants who are classified as clinically depressed. A total of 21 symptoms are
included: participants are requested to rate the intensity of these symptoms on a
scale from O to 3. Typical questions relate to such areas as sleep disturbance, sense
of failure and loss of appetite. The inventory is self administered and takes from 5
to 10 minutes. The total possible range of scores extends from a theoretical low of
0 to a high of 63. No or minimal depression is indicated by a score ofless than 10,
mild depression ranges from 10 to 16, moderate depression from 17 to 29 and
severe depression from 30 to 63 (Beck & Steer, 1987). Evaluation of content,
concurrent and discriminant validity as well as factor analysis has generally been
favourable (Groth-Marnot, 1990). A meta-analysis of the different efforts to
establish internal consistency has show them to range form .73 to .92 with a mean
of. 86 (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988).
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Obsessive compulsive disorder. Participants completed the MOC! (Hodgson &
Rachman, 1977; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980) at the completion of the experiment.
j:

The MOC! is quick and easy to administer and consists of 30 items with true/false
answers (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). In addition to
a global obsessionality score, it gives four sub-scores; checking, washing/cleaning,
slowness/repetitiveness and doubting/conscientiousness. The MOCI has been
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found to differentiate between OCD and other anxiety disorders (Hodgson &
Rachman, 1977; de Silva, 1994). In a study of 100 obsessional and 50 nonobsessional patients, Hodgson and Rachman (1977) found that the MOCI clearly
differentiated between the two groups: obsessional patients had a mean score of
18.86 (S.D. = 4.92) while non-obsessional patients had a mean score of 9.27 (S.D.

= 5.43).
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Results
The data from six participants were not included because they indicated during
the post experimental manipulation checks that they had not followed instructions.
Twenty participants withdrew from participation after recruitment because they
found they did not have time to complete the experiment, or because of
undisclosed personal reasons. The data from the remaining 74 participants were
used to evaluate the hypothesis. 80% of the remaining participants were in the age
category of 17-35 years (See Figure 1).

Age range of participants.
70

60
GI

ff

c

50
40

mPercentage I

1

~ 30

~ 20
10

0

17-25

26-35

35-45

45-60

Age

Figure 1. The age range of participants in the experiment.

A greater number of females participated in the experiment (See Figure 2). As
there is no evidence in the literature that gender difference contributes to
differential suppression effects, this was not considered to be problematic for this
experiment.
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Sex of participants
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Figure 2. The percentage of males and females who participated in the
experiment.

The number of participants in each of the four groups was approximately even
(See Table 3).

Table 3.
The number of participants in each cell after compliance check.
Group

Frequency

negative image

19

negative thought

17

positive image

19

positive thought

19

The BAI (Beck et al, 1988), BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987) and MOCI (Hodson &
Rachman, 1977; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980) revealed varying levels of anxiety,
depression and OCD in the experimental population. Overall, the mean scores for
each of these disorders fell within the non-clinical range (see Table 4).
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Table 4.
Mean scores on measures of Depression, Anxiety and Obsessive Compulsive
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Disorder
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Instrument

Mean

BAI

8.1

5.74

BDI

6.8

5.64

MOCI

5.7

4.21

Std Deviation

Note. BAI- Beck Depression Inventory; BDI - Beck Depression Inventory;
MOCI - Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Inventory.

The means and standard deviations of self reported intrusions during the
periods of suppression and non suppression are reported in Table 5.
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Table 5
Means and standard deviations of self reported intrusions of valanced mentations
during periods of suppression and non suppression.
Mentation
Valence
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Negative
10.05
Suppression
Image
7.86
Positive
8.10
4.20
Total
9.08
6.3
Thought
Negative
5.18
3.68
Positive
6.1
4.38
Total
5.67
4.03
Total
Negative
7.75
6.64
Positive
7.1
4.35
Total
7.42
5.55
Non
Image
Negative
5.26
4.98
suppression
Positive
7.84
4.96
Total
6.55
5.07
Thought
Negative
6.06
4.66
Positive
8.51
8.53
Total
7.36
6.98
Total
Negative
5.64
4.77
Positive
8.18
6.88
Total
6.95
6.05

A 2 (Mentation: thought and image) by 2 (Valence: positive and negative) by 2
(Thought instruction: suppression and non suppression) ANCOVA was done on
the remaining data with BDI, BAI and MOCI scores added as covariates (See
Appendix E). An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.
Main Effects
The nature of the mentation. The first hypothesis examines whether there is a
difference in the suppression and subsequent non suppression of the two types of
cognitive activity. As reported in Table 6, there was no significant main effect for
Mentation, E(l, 67) = 1.467, p = .230.
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The valence of the mentation. The hypothesis as to whether the positive or
negative valence of the cognitive activity has a differential effect during the
interval of suppression, then non suppression was tested next. As reported in
Table 6, there was no significant main effect for Valence, E(l,67) = .700, p = .406
Thought instruction. As reported in Table 6, there was no significant main
effect for Thought Instruction, E(l, 67) = 1.241, p = .269. This tells us that the
thought instruction (to suppress or not to suppress) did not result in a significantly
different number of intrusions
Interaction Effects
Valence and mentation. As reported in Table 6, there was no interaction effect
for Valence and Mentation, E(l, 67) = .518, p=.474.
Mentation and thought instruction. As reported in Table 6, there was a
significant interaction effect for thought instruction and mentation, E(l, 67) =
9.145, p = .004 (See Figure 3).
The differential consequences of the suppression of a
thought as compared to the suppression of an image.
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Figure 3. A significant interaction effect for thought instruction and mentation.
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Visual inspection of the interaction effect suggests that participants had more
difficulty suppressing images than thoughts. An independent 1 test was performed
on the two cognitive groups during suppression. The result of the 1 test indicates
that during the suppression period, participants from the image groups had
significantly more intrusions than participants in the thought groups, 1(72)= 2.758,
p = .007. An independent 1 test was performed on the different mentation groups
during the non suppression period. Results indicated that during non suppression,
participants from the two different cognitive groups did not have significantly
different numbers of intrusions, 1(72)= (-.572), p = .569.
Valence and thought instruction. The influence of valence on intrusion during a
period of an interval of suppression, then non suppression may be helpful in
understanding the processes involved in disorders which are negatively valenced,
and in which some form of suppression may be implicated. As reported in Table 6,
the interaction effect just failed to reach significance, E(l, 67) = 3.957, p = .051
(See Figure 4). A paired sample t test, 1(36) = 2.302, p = .027 for negatively
valenced mentations revealed a significant decrease in the number of negative
cognitions in the post suppression period.
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The differential consequences of the suppression of a positively
valenced mentation as compared to the differential
consequences of the suppression of a negatively valenced
mentation.
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Figure 4. The interaction effect for valence and thought instruction.

Mentation by valence by thought instruction. As reported in Table 6, there was
no interaction effect for Mentation by Valence by Thought instruction, E{l, 67) =
.595, p = .443.
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Discussion
This project examined firstly whether there was a difference in the suppression
and subsequent non suppression of the two types of cognitive activity, thoughts
and images. The study also looked at the influence that valence had on the
differential effects of suppression. It was hypothesised that there would be a
difference in the effects of the suppression of the two types ofvalenced mentation.
The hypothesis was supported. The specific empirical, theoretical and
methodological implications of this will be discussed in two sections: the
differential effects of suppressing the two types of mentations, and the differing
effects of suppressing valenced cognitive activity. A summary of the implications
will then be presented.
It is Easier to Suppress Thoughts Compared to Images.

There was a significant interaction effect for thought instruction and mentation.
The data suggest that participants had more difficulty suppressing images than
thoughts but that there was no significant difference in the number of intrusions in
the post suppression period. What are the implications of this?
The Suppression Paradigm. Firstly, in terms of the suppression paradigm, we
can say, comparatively speaking, there is an enhancement effect for images, but
not for thoughts. That is to say, participants experience a paradoxical effect when
they try to suppress images, compared to when they try to suppress thoughts.
During the post suppression period, there is no significantly different paradoxical
effect between the two groups.
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We can infer from these data that one of the determinates of an enhancement
effect is the specified nature of the mentation, that an intrusion is more likely to
occur if it is an image rather than a verbal linguistic cognition. It was noted that
the suppression paradigm may hold the key to understanding different patterns in
different clinical disorders, and in doing so help us to build models of
psychopathology (Zeitlin et al., 1995). This empirical finding enables us to
understand what happens when clients attempt, consciously or not, to control their
own symptomatology. Attempting to suppress an image or images will result in an
initial paradoxical effect, whereas attempts to suppress verbal linguistic cognitions
will result in significantly fewer intrusions.
Specifically, if a participant attempts suppression of a personally relevant
valenced image, and finds as demonstrated in this experiment a paradoxical effect
of the intrusion returning to mind again and again, then its possible that the
perception of uncontrollability will result. This effect however will only continue
until the impetus to suppress is withdrawn, and then there is no significant
difference in the number of intrusions. Caution should be taken with extrapolating
this finding into clinical disorders too quickly, as this particular result does not
distinguish between positively and negatively valenced mentations. That is to say,
both positively and negatively valenced images are more difficult to suppress than
positively and negatively valenced verbal linguistic cognitions, and the valence of
intrusions associated with clinical disorders such as worry, OCD and PTSD are
defined as negatively valenced.
Methodological limitations with using the enhancement/rebound label. It is
because of the significant differences between the number of intrusions in the
mentation groups that we say there is an enhancement effect for images compared

47
to thoughts. Strictly speaking, we would compare the number of intrusions with a
group who have not been exposed to any instructions not to suppress.
Similarly we might ask whether the equivalency of intrusions in the post
suppression period is actually what Wegner would call a rebound effect. The
labelling of a paradoxical effect as either an enhancement/rebound effect according
to Wegner and colleagues has been determined by comparision with a group that
has not been instructed to suppress any form of mentation. In this experiment, only
comparative declarations have been made. If necessary further investigations may
be warranted as necessary to ascertain if the findings here are necessarily
comparable to the "rebound and/or enhancement effect" as labelled in the
suppression paradigm. With this caution that the effect found refers to a
comparative effect, we will however refer to the effect found as an
enhancement/rebound effect.

It is interesting to note overall that the thought instruction, to suppress or not
to suppress, did not result in a significantly different number of intrusions. What
this experiment indicates is that while overall there may appear to be no
paradoxical effect, (eg., a rebound effect as in Wegner et al., 1987 and Clark et al.,
1991 or an enhancement effect as in Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Merckelbach et
al, 1991 ), in actual fact suppression of a personally relevant valenced verbal
linguistic mentation results in an enhancement effect. It is suggested that previous
inconsistencies in empirical findings in the suppression paradigm may have been
due to not distinguishing the type of mentation to be suppressed. An alternative
explanation might be that conceptual activity may result in a paradoxical effect if
there is sufficient power in the experiment. One way of increasing power would be
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by increasing the number of participants. This is a consideration that should be
allowed for in future experiments
To summarise, the methodological significance of this is that previous
inconsistencies in the suppression paradigm may have been due to the nature of the
mentation. The finding that suppression of a personally relevant image results in
significantly more intrusions than suppression of a personally relevant verbal
linguistic mentation in the initial period of suppression may account for previous
inconsistent results in the suppression paradigm. An alternative explanation is that
the experiment was underpowered, to allow for there to be a significant effect for
conceptual activity.
Theoretical Implications of Finding that Images are Harder than Thoughts to
Suppress
Trinder and Salkovskis ( 1994) noted the role that appraisal of initial intrusions
may have in the development of disorders such as OCD and PTSD. With both of
these disorders, the nature of the intrusions may include both thoughts and images.
Quite likely the appraisal of the paradoxical effect, due to a largely imaginal
content, may lead clients to experience a sense of uncontrollability. Resulting
compulsions to compensate for the alarming intrusions may, as suggested by
Salkovskis (1989, 1990), be implicated in the aetiology of OCD. Experiencing
unwanted intrusive cognitive activity has been found to be experienced by 80% of
the nonclinical population (Rachman and de Silva, 1978). The similarity between
normal intrusive thoughts and clinical intrusive thoughts led Rachman ( 1978) to
speculate that normal intrusive thoughts may play a role in the aetiology of OCD.
This was later extended by Salkovskis ( 1985, 1989) in a cognitive behavioural
hypothesis ofOCD.

I

i

il

49
The high rate of intrusions may also be implicated in the aetiology of PTSD.
Intuitively, it seems likely that the re-experiencing of a traumatic event that occurs
with PTSD (APA, 1994) would be in the form of images, probably images of the
actual traumatic event. The appraisal of the subsequent high rate of intrusions
would lead to associated symptomatology that is associated with PTSD, such as
for example continued distress and physiological arousal (APA, 1994). This
finding is consistent with Trinder and Salkovskis' (1994) assertion that
suppression may be responsible for the aetiology and maintenance of disorders
such as PTSD and OCD.
The same argument cannot however account for a sense of uncontrollability
that occurs with worry in both clinical and non clinical populations (Borkovec et
al, 1990; AP A, 1994) if as has been found, the content of worry is predominantly
verbal linguistic (Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993; Borkovec & Inz, 1990). It has
been suggested that the perception of the uncontrollability of worry may be due to
its conceptual nature. This study found that suppression of conceptual mentations
results in significantly fewer intrusions than suppression of imaginal mentations.
Therefore the lower rate of intrusions of conceptual activity are comparatively
least likely to lead to an appraisal that worry is uncontrollable. We can speculate
as to whether there is a threshold at which an individual decides that the
paradoxical effect is uncontrollable. Perhaps this could be a focus for further
research.
To summarise, it was noted that the suppression paradigm may hold the key to
understanding different patterns in different clinical disorders, and in doing so help
us to build models of psychopathology (Zeitlin et al., 1995). This empirical finding
enables us to understand what happens when clients attempt, consciously or not,
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to control their own symptomatology. Caution should be taken with extrapolating
this finding into clinical disorders too quickly as this particular result does not
distinguish between positively and negatively valenced mentations. However,
while it continues to be possible to argue that this finding may concur with a
hypothesis that appraisal of the paradoxical effect results in the aetiology of OCD
and PTSD, this would not be the case with worry. That is to say, it would not be
the case with worry because ofworry's predominantly verbal linguistic nature and
the comparative lower rate of conceptual intrusions. To argue more
comprehensibly it is important to look at the role of valence in these processes.
The Role of Valence
The project also_examined whether the positive or negative valence of the
cognitive activity had a differential effect during the interval of suppression, then
non suppression.
The influence of positive or negative valence on intrusions during the interval
of suppression, then non suppression may be helpful in understanding the
processes involved in disorders which are negatively valenced, and in which some
form of suppression may be implicated. The interaction effect between valence and
thought instruction just failed to reach significance. There are two reasons why we
should consider the effect to be significant: first, because the probability level was
.051, and second because variability as measured by the covariates was measured
at the end of the experiment. It may be that removing the variability as measured
by the covariates also removed the shared variability of the dependent variable
which was affected by the independent variables. Ideally this is usually avoided by
taking the measures for the covariates at the commencement of the experiment,
but in this experiment the instruments used to measure covariates were negatively

,,
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valenced, and would have confounded the experiment. In summary, we consider
the probability level of the interaction between valence and thought instruction to
be significant.
Subsequent tests showed that negative mentations compared to positive
mentations decrease significantly in the post suppression period. What is also
interesting is that this finding applies for both negatively valenced thoughts and
negatively valenced images, as the higher interaction between mentation and
valence and thought instruction was not significant.
Suppressing Negative Thoughts and Images Results in Significantly Fewer
Intrusions in the Post Suppression Period
The application of the finding that negatively valenced mentations decrease
significantly in the post suppression period will be discussed by firstly addressing
the application to the suppression paradigm, and then by discussing the theoretical
implications.
Application to the Suppression paradigm
This finding may shed some light on the conflicting findings in the suppression
paradigm. Perhaps the inconsistencies are due to two things: firstly as already
discussed, not distinguishing between both the nature of the mentation to be
suppressed, and/or secondly, not consistently distinguishing between the valence
(either positive or negative) of the cognitive activity to be suppressed.
Theoretical implications
This project has shown that a paradoxical effect is significantly more likely to
occur with images, than with thoughts. It has also shown that the number of
negatively valenced intrusions compared to positively valenced intrusions

l
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significantly decreases in the post suppression period. Addressing these findings
may be a fruitful way of explaining inconsistencies and establishing a means of
developing models of psychopathology. For example, it has been previously
argued that suppression of negatively valenced mentation is hampered by selection
of negatively valenced distractors
In contrast to Wenzlaff et al (1988) this experiment found that there was no
significant difference in the ability to suppress positive or negatively valenced
mentations, but rather that suppression of negative mentations led to significantly
fewer intrusions in the post suppression period when compared with suppression
of positively valenced mentations. The results of this suggest that participants are
not confined to selecting only negative distractors, as there is no difference
between the number of positively and negatively valenced intrusions during
suppression. Further, distraction, if that is the process that is occurring, is possible
in the post suppression period for negatively valenced cognitive activity.
The role of valence in determining a paradoxical effect. Some empirical studies
had indicated that only suppression of neutrally valenced mentation resulted in a
paradoxical effect (Muris et al, 1992; Lavy and van den Hout, 1990; Wegner &
Gold, 1992), whereas other studies had indicated that suppression of a valenced
cognition resulted in a paradoxical effect (Muris and Merckelbach, 1991, as cited
by Muris et al, 1992). This project has demonstrated that a paradoxical effect is
predetermined by suppression ofvalenced mentation, but may be influenced by the
nature of the mentation, and whether the valence is positive or negative.
The personal relevance of the stimulus and the valence appear to be influential
in determining this effect. This study may clarify Wenzlaff, Wegner & Klein's
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( 1991) assertion that the contextual valence of the suppressed mentation
determines the subsequent paradoxical effect in the post suppression period. In
their experiment, only a neutral stimulus was used, but it was paired with a
positive or negative valenced context. In the post suppression period they found
that matched contextual valence across the suppression and the non suppression
period results in greater intrusions than non matched contextual valence.
This study determined that the polarity of the valence may also determine the
presence of subsequent intrusions. The two studies differ in that Wenzlaff et al' s
( 1991) study did not use personally relevant valenced mentations, but artificially
induced valence onto a neutral stimulus. The theoretical implications ofWenzlaff
et al' s ( 1991) study is that polarity of the induced valence becomes bonded to the
stimulus during suppression, and seems to act as a involuntary reminder of the
stimulus. The polarity of the personally relevant valenced stimuli, as shown in this
study, actually determines the non suppression rate of intrusion, suggesting either
of two things: firstly, that the personal relevance of the valenced stimuli
determines the result, or secondly, that the polarity of the valence determines the
result. In the former case, it has been suggested that the personal relevance of the
stimuli enables the participant to have already established a distractor network
(Wegner & Gold, 1992). If this is true, then it should be true for both positive or
negative stimuli. This suggestion is not consistent with the results of this study. In
the latter case, in which the polarity of the mentation determines the result, there
are a number of speculative reasons why this might be so. Firstly, perhaps the
negatively valenced stimuli is so aversive, that the participants continue to
suppress, even though they report that they have stopped suppressing. Whereas
for the positive group, the stimuli is not so aversive, and the need to avoid the
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stimulus is not as necessary. If this is the reason, then it implies a level of mental
control.
Such a position would be consonant with Well's (1994) theoretical position on
worry that although the initial intrusion may be automatic, the continuing
processing is a consciously controlled process. He believes that although worry
may be initiated automatically and involuntarily, that it is a conscious controlled
processing activity requiring large amounts of processing capacity. One reason he
suggests for its uncontrollability is because of appraisals surrounding the
involuntary initiation of worry.
We have seen however that the conceptual intrusions are comparatively less
frequent than imaginal intrusions. As already mentioned, it would be necessary to
establish a threshold of the number of intrusions occurring that initiate a labelling
of uncontrollability before one could argue that the results of this study are totally
consonant with Wells' theoretical position.
This study however does not clarify Wells and Papageorgiou's (1994)
argument that worry both tags and blocks emotional integration. They argued that
tagging, a generalising of retrieval cues, increases the subsequent number of mood
related intrusions. This study has found that an attempt to suppress negatively
valenced thoughts and images results in a post suppression decrease in the number
of intrusions when compared to positively valenced intrusive activity. The results
of this study seem to imply that tagging does not occur, or if it does, that it is
under conscious control. An alternative explanation is that suppression of
negatively valenced mentations results in a degree of emotional integration, as
evidenced by the reduction of intrusive mentations (Rachman, 1980). That is to
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say, blocking of emotional integration that is said to occur because ofworry's
conceptual nature does not occur because of the process of suppression.
The results of this study seem to warrant further investigation with reference
to reconciling Wells and Papageorgiou's position. Such an investigation might
include physiological measures that might indicate if a lack of an anxiety response
is maintaining a blocking of emotional integration.
To summarise, the finding of this study that the negative polarity of the valence
of a mentation results in a significant decrease in a post suppression decrease in
intrusive mentations implies one of two things. First, that emotional processing
occurs for negatively valenced mentations when suppressed, as evidenced by the
reduction of intrusive mentations (Rachman, 1980). Alternatively, that processing
of intrusive activity is under conscious control, and the resulting decrease in
negatively valenced mentation in a post suppression period is because of a
conscious desire to avoid the aversively valenced mentations.
Summary
This study has enabled us to clarify whether the conceptual nature of worry
contributes to the appraisal that clinical and non-clinical populations have that
worry is uncontrollable. It was proposed that it was unlikely that the conceptual
nature of worry contributes to this appraisal of uncontrollability because
suppression of conceptual activity results in significantly fewer intrusions than
suppression of imaginal cognitive activity. In coming to this position, this study
has identified pre-determinates of paradoxical effects in the suppression paradigm
that occur when participants attempt to suppress cognitive activity. Specifically
this study found that one predeterminate of a paradoxical effect is the nature of the
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mentation: comparatively speaking, suppression of a thought is significantly less
likely than an image to result in intrusive mentations. This finding could be a focus
for further investigation, with an emphasis on comparing the significant difference
with a presuppression period to enable a baseline measure to be taken. Such
further investigation would enable generalising the results into treatment. It
appears that another predeterminate is the polarity of the valence. Specifically,
suppression of negatively valenced mentations results in a significant decrease in
intrusions in the post suppression period.
This study also enabled us to examine more closely some empirical findings,
and relative theoretical positions. If as has been postulated, suppression of
negatively valenced mentations results in emotional processing, then the finding
that suppressing negatively valenced mentations results in significantly fewer
intrusions as compared to positive mentations in the post suppression period has a
number of implications for treatment of disorders where intrusive cognitive
activity is a symptom. For example, does thought stopping actually work? Does
the resulting discovery that the number of intrusions decrease result in an appraisal
in the post suppression period that one can actually stop worrying? This result
would indicate that that might be the case. It is then understandable that clients
may choose suppression as a way of controlling worry, as these results indicate
that it may be effective.
Alternatively, it has been postulated that consistent with Wells' (1994)
position, there is a level of conscious control over intrusion in a post suppression
period, which results in an avoidance of the aversively valenced mentation. Further
investigation is necessary to resolve these questions. Later investigations might
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include extending to clinical samples of specific disorders to enable the
establishment of psychopathological models (Zeitman et al, 1985), and hence
potential bases for treatment.

58

References
American Psychiatric Association. (1994) Diagnostic and statistical

manual of

mental disorders. (4th ed) Washington, DC: Author.

Andrews, G., Crino, R., Hunt, C., Lampe, L. & Page, A. (1995) The treatment of

anxiery disorders. Cambridge: New York. Cambridge University Press.

Beck, A. T., Epstein, N., Brown, G. & Steer, RA. (1988) An inventory for
measuring clinical anxiety: Psychometric properties. Journal of

Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56, 893-897.

Beck, A. T. & Steer, R. A. (1987) Manual for the revised Beck Depression

Inventory. San Antonio. San Antonio, TX: The Psychological
corporation.

Beck, A. T. & Steer, R. A. (1990) Manual for the revised Beck Depression

Inventory. San Antonio. San Antonio, TX: The Psychological
Corporation.

Beck, A. T., Rush, A.J., Shaw, B.F. & Emery, G. (1979) Cognitive therapy of

depression. New York, NY: Guilford Press.

59
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A. & Garbin, M. (1988) Psychometric properties of the
Beck Depression Inventory; Twenty-five years of evaluation. Clinical
Psychology Review, 8, 77-100.

Borkovec, T.D. & Hu, S. (1990) The effect of worry on cardiovascular response
to phobic imagery. Behaviour Research Therapy, 28, 60-73.

Borkovec, T. D. & Inz, J. (1990) The nature of worry in generalized anxiety
disorder: A predominance of thought activity. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 28, 153-158.

Borkovec, T. D. & Lyonfields, J.D. (1993) Worry: Thought suppression of
emotional processing. In Heinz Walter Krohene, (Ed.) Attention and
avoidance: strategies in coping with aversiveness. (pplOl-118)

Gottingen, Hogrefe & Huber.

Borkovec, T. D., Shadick, R., & Hopkins, M. (1991) The nature of normal
versus pathological worry. In R. Rapee & D.H. Barlow (Eds). Chronic
anxiety: Generalised anxiety disorder and mixed anxiety-depression

(pp29-51). New

York: Guilford Press.

Brown, T. A., Dowdall, D. J., Cote, G. & Barlow, D. H. (1994) Worry and
obsessions: the distinction between generalised anxiety disorder and
obsessive-compulsive disorder. In Davey, G.C.L & Tallis, F. (Eds)

60
Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment and treatment (pp.229246). Chichester: Wiley.

Butler, G. ( 1994) Treatment of worry in generalised anxiety disorder. In Davey,
G.C.L & Tallis, F. (Eds) Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment

and treatment (pp.209-228). Chichester: Wiley.

Clark, D. M., Ball, S. & Pape, D. (1991) An experimental investigation of
thought suppression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 29, 253-257.

Davey, G.C.L. (1994) Pathological worrying as exacerbated problem-solving. In
Davey, G.C.L & Tallis, F. (Eds) Worrying: Perspectives on theory,

assessment and treatment ( pp.35-60) Chichester: Wiley.

de Silva, P. (1994) Obsessions and compulsions. Investigation. In Lindsay,
S.J.E. & Powell, G.E. (Eds.) The Handbook of Clinical Adult

Psychology. (2nd ed., pp.51-70). Routledge, London.
------------- ----

--------- - - -

Dent, H. R. & Salkovskis, P.M. (1986) Clinical measures of depression,
anxiety and obsessionality in nonclinical populations. Behavioural

Research and Therapy, 24, 689-691.

L

61

Dollard, J. & Miller, N. E. (1950) Personality and psychotherapy. New York:
McGraw-Hill.

Edwards, S. & Dickerson, M. (1987) Intrusive unwanted thoughts: A two-stage
model of control. British Journal ofMedical Psychology, 60, 317-328.

Foa, E.B., & Kozak, M.J. (1986) Emotional processing of fear: Exposure to
corrective information. Psychological Bulletin, 99, 20-35.

Fennel, M. J. V. & Teasdale, J. D. (1984) Effects of distraction on thinking and
affect in depressed patients. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 23,

65-66.

Fennel, M.J.V., Teasdale, J.D., Jones, S. & Damle, A. (1987) Distraction in
neurotic and endogenous depression: An investigation of negative
thinking in major depressive disorder. Psychological Medicine, 14,

441-452.

Flett, G.L.& Blankstein, KR. (1994) Worry as a component oftest anxiety: a
multidimensional analysis. In Davey, G.C.L & Tallis, F. (Eds)

Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment and treatment (pp. 134181). Chichester: Wiley.

62

Fydrich, T., Dowdall, D. & Chambless, D .L. (1990) Aspects of reliability and

validity for the Beck Anxiety Inventory. Paper presented at the National
Conference on Phobias and Related Anxiety Disorders, Bethseda, MD.

Gray, J.A. (1982) Precis of 'The neuropsychology of anxiety: An inquiry into the
functions of the septo-hippocampal system'. Behavioral and Brain

Sciences, 5, 469-534.

Gross, RT. & Borkovec, T. D. (1982) Effects of a cognitive intrusion
manipulation on the sleep-onset latency of good sleepers. Behavior

Therapy, 13, 112-116.

Groth-Marnot, G. (1990) Handbook of Psychological Assessment. Wiley
Interscience New York.

Hodson, R.J. and Rachman, (1977) Obsessive-compulsive complaints. Behaviour

Research and Therapy, 15, 389-95.

Kelly, A. E., & Kahn, J.H. (1994) Effects of suppression of personal intrusive
thoughts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 998-1006.

Lavy, E.H. & van den Hout (1990) Thought suppression induces intrusions.

Behavioural Psychotherapy, 18, 251-258.

63

McNally, R.J. & Steketee, G.S. (1985) The etiology and maintenance of severe
animal phobias. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23, 431-435.

Mathews, A. & Milroy, R. (1994) Effects of priming and suppression of worry.

Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32, 843-850.

Merckelbach, H., Muris, P., van den Hout, M. and de Jong, P. (1991) Rebound
effects of thought suppression: Instruction-dependent?

Behavioural Psychotherapy, 19, 225-238.

Muris, P., Merckelbach, H. & de Jong, P. (1993) Verbalisation and
environmental cueing in thought suppression. Behaviour Research and

Therapy, 31, 609-612.

Muris, P., Merckelbach, H. van den Hout, M. & de Jong, P. (1992)
Suppression of emotional and neutral material. Behaviour Research

and Therapy, 30, 639-642.

Rachman, S. (1978) Anatomy of obsessions. Behaviour Analysis and

Modification, 2, 253-278.

Rachman, S. (1980) Emotional processing. Behaviour Research and Therapy,

18, 51-60.

64

Rachman, S.J. & de Silva, P. (1978) Abnormal and normal obsessions.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 16, 233-248.

Rachman, S.J. & Hodson, R.J. (1980) Obsessions and Compulsions. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Roemer, L. & Borkovec, T.D. (1993) Worry: Unwanted cognitive activity that
controls unwanted somatic experience. In Wegner, D.M. & Penebaker,
J.W. (Eds) Handbook of mental control (p 220-239). Prentice Hall,
New Jersey.

Salkovskis, P.M. (1985) Obsessional-compulsive problems: a cognitivebehavioural analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23, 571-583.

Salkovskis, P.M. (1989) Cognitive-behavioural factors and the persistence of
intrusive thoughts in obsessional problems. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 27, 677-682.

Salkovskis, P.M. & Campbell, P. (1994) Thought suppression induces intrusion
in naturally occurring negative intrusive thoughts. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 32, 1-8.

Steer, RA. Beck, AT., & Garrison, B. (1985).Applications of the Beck
Depression Inventory. In N. Sartorius & T.A. Ban (Ed.) Assessment of

65
depression (ppl21-142). Geneva, Switzerland: World Health
Organisation.

Tallis, F., Davey, G C. L. & Capuzzo, N. (1994) The phenomenology ofnonpathological worry: a preliminary investigation. In Davey, G.C.L and
Tallis, F. (Eds) Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment and

treatment (pp. 62-89). Chichester: Wiley.

Trinder, H., & Salkovskis, P.M. (1994) Personally relevant intrusions outside the
laboratory: long-term suppression increases intrusion. Behaviour

Research Therapy, 32, 833-842.

Wegner, D.M., Schneider, D.J., Carter, S.R., & White, L. (1987)
Paradoxical effects of thought suppression. Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 63, 5-13.

Wegner, D.M. (1988) Stress and mental control. In Fisher, S. & Reason, J.
(Eds). Handbook of life stress, cognition and health. New York:
Wiley.

Wegner, D.M. (1989) White bears and other unwanted thoughts.

Suppression, obsession and the psychology of mental control. New
York: Viking.

66
Wegner, D.M., Schneider, D.J., Knutson, B. and McMahon, S.R. (1991). On
polluting the stream of consciousness: The effect of thought
suppression on the mind's environment. Cognitive Therapy and

Research, 15, 141-152.

Wegner, D.M. and Gold, D.B. (1995) Fanning old flames: emotional and
cognitive effects of suppressing thoughts of a past relationship. Journal

of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 782-792.

Wells, A. (1994) Attention and the control of worry. In Davey, G.C.L and Tallis,
F. (Eds) Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment and treatment
(pp. 91-114). Chichester: Wiley.

Wells, A., & Papageorgiou, C (1994) Worry and the incubation of intrusive
images following stress. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 579583.

Wenzlaff, R. M., Wegner, D.M. & Klein, S.B. (1991) The role of thought
suppression in the bonding of thought and mood. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 500-508.

Wenzlaff, RM., Wegner, D., & Roper, D.W. (1988) Depression and mental
control: the resurgence of unwanted negative thoughts. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 882-892.

67

Wolpe, J. & Lazarus, A.A. (1966) Behavior therapy techniques. New York:
Pergamon Press.

Zeitlin, S.B, Netten, K.A., and Hodder, S. H. (1995).Thought suppression: an
experimental investigation of spider phobics. Behaviour Research

Therapy, 33, 407-413.

68

Appendix A
Instructions to each group
Group 1. Suppression of negative image
•

I would like you to picture something that you would find very negative. It may
be something that you found to be very distressing or made you very angry or
upset. Please take your time to think of something that you consider to be very
negative. I would like you to imagine yourself in that situation. Picture what is
around you. Picture what you are feeling. Picture your surroundings. Is there
anyone else there? What does it look like? What does it smell like. What colour
is it? What does it feel like? When you feel that you have an image clearly in
your mind, lease let me know. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is the least
distressing, and 10 is the most distressing how would you rate it?. (If greater
than 7, proceed. if not, ask what would make this more negative.)

•

Now, I would like you to not think about the agreed image for the next 5
minutes. If the image does come to mind, I would like you to suppress the image.
Please however, indicate that the image has returned by marking the sheet in
front of you. In order to prepare for that I would like you to have the pencil in your
hand near the paper.(Participant should indicate that he/she understands.) I will
tell you when the five minutes is up.
(Experimenter leaves the room, and returns after five minutes)
*******

• Now, I would like you to feel free to think about anything for the next five
minutes. If you think about the agreed image, don't suppress the image, but
continue to feel free to think about anything. If the image does come to mind, then
please mark the paper in front of you.
********

• Finally, Please rate on a scale of 1- 10 how negative you found the image to be
now. Remember that 1 is least negative and 10 is the most negative.
• Please also indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how well you think you complied with
the instructions that were given to you.
*********
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Group 2. Suppression of negative thought
• I would like you to choose a topic for a speech from the list in front of you. Please
choose the topic that you find the most emotionally negative. I would like you to
pick a speech that you find the most upsetting or distressing. If you can't find a
topic there that you don't find upsetting, then please feel free to think of a speech
topic that you find personally upsetting. Take some time to think of a speech topic
that is appropriate.
• Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how negative you find the topic.( If greater
than 7 than proceed, if not ask how you can change the topic to make it more
positive or negative).

• Now in about ten minutes I would like you to give this speech on the agreed topic.
Before then I would like you to suppress all thoughts of the speech. You can think
about anything during this time, but please do not think about the speech that
you are going to deliver. If you do find your thoughts slipping towards it, then
please suppress the thoughts, but indicate on the sheet in front of you. In order to
prepare for that I would like you to have the pencil in your hand near the
paper.(Participant should indicate that he/she understands.) I will tell you when
the five minutes is up.
*******• Now, I would like you to feel free to think about anything for the next five
minutes. If you think about the agreed speech, don't suppress the speech, but
continue to feel free to think about anything. If the speech does come to mind,
however, then please mark the paper in front of you.

"'""""'"'"'"'"'"'"'""""'
• Finally please indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how positive you find the speech
topic to be now.
• Please also indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how well you think you complied with
the instructions that were given to you. (That is, firstly by choosing a negative
speech topic, attempting to suppress the topic, and finally thinking freely.)
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Group 3. Suppression of positive image
• I would like you to picture something that you would find very positive. It may be
something that you found to make you very happy or joyful. Please take your
time to think of something that you consider to be very positive. I would like you to
imagine yourself in that positive situation. Picture what is around you. Picture
what you are feeling. Picture your surroundings. Is there anyone else there?
What does it look like? What does it smell like. What colour is it? What does it
feel like? When you feel that you have an image clearly in your mind, lease let
me know. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is the least distressing, and 1O is the
most distressing how would you rate it?. (If greater than 7, proceed. if not, ask
what would make this more negative. )

•

• Now, I would like you to not think about the agreed image for the next 5 minutes.
If the image does come to mind, I would like you to suppress the image. Please
however, indicate that the image has returned by marking the sheet in front of
you. In order to prepare for that I would like you to have the pencil in your hand
near the paper.(Participant should indicate that he/she understands.) I will tell
you when the five minutes is up.
(Experimenter leaves the room, and returns after five minutes)

*******

• Now, I would like you to feel free to think about anything for the next five
minutes. If you think about the agreed image, don't suppress the image, but
continue to feel free to think about anything. If the image does come to mind, then
please mark the paper in front of you.
********

• Finally, Please rate on a scale of 1- 1O how negative you found the image to be
now. Remember that 1 is least negative and 1O is the most negative.
*********

• Please also indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how well you think you complied with
the instructions that were given to you.
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Group 4. Suppression of positive thought
• I would like you to choose a topic for a speech from the list in front of you. Please
choose the topic that you find the most emotionally positive. I would like you to
pick a speech that you find the most happy or joyful. If you can't find a topic there
that you don't find positive and uplifting, then please feel free to think of a speech
topic that you find personally positive and uplifting. Take some time to think of a
speech topic that is appropriate. (Participant should indicate when ready)
• Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 1O how positive you find the topic.( If greater
than 7 than proceed, if not ask how you can change the topic to make it more
positive or negative).

• Now in about ten minutes I would like you to give this speech on the agreed topic.
Before then I would like you to suppress all thoughts of the speech. You can think
about anything during this time, but please do not think about the speech that
you are going to deliver. If you do find your thoughts slipping towards it, then
please suppress the thoughts, but indicate on the sheet in front of you. In order to
prepare for that I would like you to have the pencil in your hand near the
paper.(Participant should indicate that he/she understands.) I will tell you when
the five minutes is up.

• Now, I would like you to feel free to think about anything for the next five
minutes. If you think about the agreed speech, don't suppress the speech, but
continue to feel free to think about anything. If the speech does come to mind,
however, then please mark the paper in front of you.

""""""""""""''
• Finally please indicate on a scale of 1 to 1O how negative you found the speech
topic to be now.
*****-*******

Please also indicate on a scale of 1 to 1O how well you think you complied with the
instructions that were given to you. (That is, firstly by choosing a positive speech
topic, attempting to suppress the topic, and finally thinking freely.)
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Work
Work
Work
Work

Appendix B
sheet 1 for group 1
sheet 2 for group 2
sheet 3 for group 3
sheet 4 for group 4
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Work Sheet 1
A. Rate your negative image on a scale of 1 to 10
(where 1 is least negative and 10 is most negative).
/10
******************************************

B. Period 1
1
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91
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***************************************************************

D. Please rate how negative you found the image to be
now.
/10.

E. Please rate how well you complied with the
instructions that were given to you.
/10.
F. Please feel free to make any comments about the
testing or the instructions.
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Work Sheet 2
A. Rate your negative speech topic on a scale of 1 to 10
(where 1 is least negative and 10 is most negative).
/10
******************************************

B. Period 1
1
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D. Please rate how negative you found the speech topic
to be now.
/10.

E. Please rate how well you complied with the
instructions that were given to you.
/10.
F. Please feel free to make any comments about the
testing or the instructions.

77

Work Sheet 3
A. Rate your positive image on a scale of 1 to 10 (where
1 is least positive and 10 is most positive).
/10
******************************************

B. Period 1
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***************************************************************
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D. Please rate how positive you found the image to be
now.
/10.

E. Please rate how well you complied with the
instructions that were given to you.
/10.
F. Please feel free to make any comments about the
testing or the instructions.
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Work Sheet 4
A. Rate your positive speech topic on a scale of 1 to 10
(where 1 is least positive and 10 is most positive).
/10
******************************************

B. Period 1
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D. Please rate how positive you found the speech topic
to be now.
/10.

E. Please rate how well you complied with the
instructions that were given to you.
/10.
F. Please feel free to make any comments about the
testing or the instructions.
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Appendix C
INVESTIGATION INTO TYPES OF MENTATION
NAME;
I hereby consent to the experiment and give permission to use the obtained data in
publication. I will not be identifiable as a participant in this experiment in any
material published.
Signature:

Telephone:
Dear Participant,
Thank you for helping me with my research. I am investigating the processes
involved in the suppression of different types of mentation as part of a project which
will be used to complete a course requirement for a Master of Psychology (Clinical)
at Edith Cowan University.
The experiment will take approximately 20 minutes. You will be asked to complete a
questionnaire which will ask you about thoughts and feelings you may have
experienced in the past week. Then you will be asked to think about or to imagine a
vivid object that is personally relevant to you. You will then be asked not to think
about the nominated object for a period of five minutes.You will then be asked to
relax for a brief period. If you indicate in the questionnaire that you are
contemplating suicide, then you may be contacted and referred to a counselling
service. You will not be contacted under any other circumstances, but if you have
any questions related to these questionnaires then you may contact the
experimenter.
This research will help us to understand thought processes. Should you have any
questions or concerns about the experiment, immediately after the experiment or
subsequently, then do not hesitate to contact me care of the School of Psychology,
Joondalup Campus, Joondalup. You are reminded that you can withdraw from the
project at any time. Your participation is voluntary. Your participation (or withdrawal)
will have no bearing on your enrolment. Your name and a contact number is
required, but all identifying data will be removed from the experimental data. If you
choose to submit a questionnaire without your name, then filling in and submitting
the questionnaire will be taken as consent to the experiment.

Yours faithfully,

Jacinta Willans

A/Professor Helmes
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Appendix D
Psychometric Instruments Used as Measures of
Covariance.
Beck Anxiety Inventory
Beck Depression Inventory.
Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory
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Beck Anxiety Inventory

Instructions
Below is a list of common symptoms of anxiety. Please carefully read each item in the list. Indicate
how much you have been bothered by each symptom during the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY, by
placing an [X] in the corresponding space in the column next to each symptom.

1. Numbness or tingling
2. Feeling hot.
3. Wobbliness in legs.
4. Unable to relax.
5. Fear of the worst.
6. Dizzy or lightheaded
7. Heart pounding or racing.
8. Unsteady.
9. Terrified.
10. Nervous.
11. Feelings of choking.
12. Hands trembling.
13. Shaky.
14. Fear of losing control.
15. Difficulty breathing.
16. Fear of dying.
17. Scared.
18. Indigestion or discomfort in
abdomen.

19. Faint.
20. Face flushing.
21. Sweating [not due to heat].

NOT

MILDLY

MODERATELY

SEVERELY

AT
ALL

It did not
bother me
much

It was very
unpleasant,
but I could
stand it

I could barely
stand it
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Beck Depression Inventory
Instructions:
On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully. Then pick out the one statement in each group which
best describes the way you have been feeling over the PAST WEEK INCLUDING TOOAY. Circle the number beside the statement you picked. If several
statements in a group seem lo apply equally well, circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your choice.

1.

0
1

2
3

2.

0
1

2
3

3.

I do not feel sad.
I feel sad.
I am sad all time and I can't snap out of ii.
I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand ii.
I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
I fell discouraged about the future.
I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
I feel that the future is hopeless and that things
cannot improve.

0
1
2

I do not feel like a failure.
I feel I have failed more than the average person
As I look back on my life, all I can see are a lot
of failures.
3
I feel I am a complete failure as a person.

4. 0

I get as much satisfaction out of things as I
used to.
1
I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
2
I don't get real satisfaction out of anything
anymore.
3
I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.

5.

0
1

2
3

I don't feel particularly guilty.
I feel guilty a good part of the time.
I feel quite guilty most of the lime.
I feel guilty all of the time.

12. 0
1

2
3
13. 0
1

2
3

14. 0
1

2
3
15.

0
1

2
3
16.

0
1

2
3

6.

17. 0

3

I don't feel I am being punished.
I feel I may be punished
I expect lo be punished.
I feel I am being punished.

0
1
2
3

I don't feel disappointed in myself.
I am disappointed in myself.
I am disgusted with myself.
I hale myself

18. 0

0
1

2

7.

8.

0
1

2
3
9.

0

2
3
10.

0

1
2.
3
11.

0
1

2
3

1

2
3

1

2
3

I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else.
I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or
mistakes.
I blame myself all the time for my faults.
I blame myself for every1hing bad that happens.

19.

I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not
carry them out.
I would like to kill myself.

20.

1

2
3

I make decisions about as well as I ever could.
I put off making decisions more than I used to.
I have greater difficulty in making decisions than
before.
I can't make decisions al all anymore.
I don't feel I look any worse than I used to.
I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.
I feel that there are permanent changes in my
appearance that make me look unattractive.
I believe that I look ugly.
I can work about as well as before.
It takes an extra effort to gel started at doing
something.
I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
I can't do any work at all.

I can sleep as well as usual.
I don't sleep as well as I used to.
I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it
hard to gel back to sleep.
I wake up several hours earlier than usual and
cannot gel back, to sleep.
I don't get any more tired than usual.
I get tired more easily than I used to.
I gel tired from doing almost anything.
I am too tired lo do anything.
My appetite is no worse than usual.
My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
My appetite is much worse now.
I have no appetite al all anymore.
I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately.
I have lost more than 2.5 kilograms.
I have lost more than 5 kilograms.
I have lost more than 7 kilograms.

0

I am no more worried about my health than usual.
I am worried about physical problems such as
aches and pains, or upset stomach or constipation.
2
I am very worried about physical problems and
its hard lo think of much else.
3
I am so worried about my physical problems that
I cannot think about anything else.

1

I would kill myself if I had the chance.
I don't cry anymore than usual.
I cry more now than I used to.
I cry all the time now.
I used lo be able to cry, but now I can't cry even
though I want lo.

0

I have not lost interest in other people.
I am less interested in other people than I used
to be.
I have lost most of my interest in other people.
I have lost all of my interest in other people.

21

0

I have not noticed any recent change in my
interest in sex.
1
I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2
I am much less interested in sex now.
3
I have lost interest in sex completely.

I am no more irritated now than I ever am.
I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used
I feel irritated all the time now.
I don't get irritated at all by the things that used
to irritate me.

Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory.
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Instructions: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the 'True' or 'False' following the
question. There are no right or wrong answeres, and no trick questions. Work quickly and do not think
too long about the exact meaning of the question.
1 I avoid using public telephones because of possible contamination

False

True

2 I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them True
3 I am more concerned than most people about honesty

False
False

True

4 I am often late because I can't seem to get through everything on time

True

False

5 I don't worry unduly about contamination if I touch an animal

True

False

6 I frequently have to check things (e.g. gas or water taps, doors, etc.)
several times

True

False

7 I have a very strict conscience

True

False

8 I find that almost every day I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that
come into my mind against my will

True

False

9 I do not unduly worry if I accidently bump into somebody.

True

False

10 I usually have serious doubts about the simple everyday things I do

True

False

11 Neither of my parents was very strict during my childhood

True

False

12 I tend to get behind in my work because I repeat things over and
over again.

False

True

13 I use only an average amount of soap

True

14 Some numbers are extremely unlucky

True

15 I do not check letters over and over again before posting them

False
False
False

True

16 I do not take a long time to dress in the morning

True

False

17 I am not excessively concerned about cleanliness

True

False

18 One of my major problems is that I pay too much attention to detail
19 I can use well-kept toilets without any hesitation

True

False
False

True

20 My major problem is repeated checking

True

False

21 I am not unduly concerned about cleanliness

True

False

22 I do not tend to check things more than one

True

False

23 I do not stikc to a very strict routine when doing ordinary things

True

False

24 My hands do not feel dirty after touching money

True

False

25 I don not usually count when doing a routine task

True

False

26 I take rather a long time to complete my washing in the morning
27 I do not use a great deal of antiseptics

True

28 I spend a lot of time every day checking things over and over again

False
False

True
True

29 Hanging and folding my clothes at night does not take up a lot of time True

False
False

30 Even when I do something very carefully I often feel that it is not quite
right

True

False
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Appendix E
ANCOVA Table
Source
df

Sum
of squares

Mean square

F

Observed
power

Between Subjects
Intercept
1
BAI
1
BDI
1
MOCI
1
Mentation
1
Valence
1
Mentation by
Valence
1
Error
67
Thought
Instruction 1
Thought
Instruction
by BAI
1
Thought
Instruction
1
by BDI
Thought
Instruction
byMOCI
1
Thought
Instruction
by
Mentation
1
Thought
Instruction
by Valence 1
Thought
Instruction
by Mentation
by Valence 1
Error
67

1472.381
5.439
39.802
19.579
70.451
33.597

1472.381
5.439
39.802
19.579
70.451
33.597

30.662
.113
.829
.408
1.467
.700

1.000
.063
.146
.096
.223
.131

24.861
3217.291

24.861
48.019
Within Subjects

.518

.109

22.337

22.337

1.241

.196

.342

342

.019

.052

15.420

15.420

.858

.150

1.702

1.702

.759

.061

164.577

164.577

9.145**

.846

71.217

71.217

3.957

.500

10.706
1205.821

10.706
17.997

.595

.118

Note *p < .05. **p<.01.

